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Abstract
We use micro data to analyse the effect of human capital externality on earn-
ings and private returns to education. The earnings equations are estimated using
the OLS method for a sample of full-time workers. The results show that human
capital has a positive effect on earnings, indicating that an increase in education
benefits all workers. However, men benefit more from women’s education than
the women do from men’s. The effects of human capital externality on private
returns to schooling are shown to vary substantially between rural and urban areas
and across levels of the education system.
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11. Introduction
At the time of independence shortage of skilled labour was a major constraint to the
achievement of the nation’s development goals. To improve this situation the Kenyan
government has consistently devoted a large share of its budget to education
expansion. For instance, the education sector share of total government budget in
1998 was 29 percent, one of the highest in Africa. In the earlier decades after
independence, most of the expansion took place at the primary and secondary
education levels. With time and especially since the late 1980s, there has also been a
rapid expansion in the number of public and private universities. Student enrolments
in primary and secondary schools increased from 0.9 and 0.03 million in 1963 to 5.9
and 0.7 million in 2000, respectively. The number of primary and secondary schools
also increased from 6,058 and 150 in 1963 to about 18,617 and 3,207 in 2000,
respectively. The number of schools may, however, understate the extent of
expansion in the education system since within the existing schools, expansion was
in form of increased number of classes.
At the primary level, the expansion was partly due to free primary education
introduced in 1974, while at the secondary level, the increase was due to the large
number of schools, built through self-help initiatives in response to the high demand
for secondary education.1 Given the large amounts of resources devoted to education
by both government and parents, it is fitting to investigate whether the education
system yields returns to individuals that justify the resources they invest in schooling.
Estimates of returns to education conventionally measure the benefits of education in
the form of higher wages. Private rates of return to education include only private
benefits and costs, while social rates of return to education differ from the private
returns only by inclusion of direct cost of education to the society as well as the
benefits to it in terms of higher tax revenues.
In terms of policy making, returns to education are useful in a number of ways. For
instance, social returns are useful in giving an indication of which sector of the
education system the government should invest in most. If there are significant
differences in returns to primary and secondary education, this is a signal to policy
2makers and households to invest relatively more in the education level that yields
higher returns.
An analysis of returns to education can also help in the evaluation of broad education
policies. It is, for example, well established that human capital development is
crucial to economic development (Ranis et al. 2000). Government should therefore
seek to adopt policies that are consistent with human capital development. To the
extent that returns to education in a particular country may show a declining trend, it
is necessary to evaluate the causes of such decline. On the one hand, declining
returns may influence private choices on education as evidenced by high drop-out
rates and low enrolments. On the other hand, it could be that government policies
themselves are responsible for the decline in enrolment. For example, it has been
shown that the policy of cost-sharing in education in Kenya has had a negative
impact on primary school enrolments (Bedi et al., 2004). Further, households
evaluate benefits of schooling decisions in terms of the future income returns. If
these benefits are too low, then policies advocating for the use of education services
as part of the poverty alleviation package may be ill-conceived. Alternatively, if
these returns are very high despite low enrolments, it could be evidence that
individuals are not able to obtain the optimal amount of education. Thus, a study on
returns to education has several important policy implications.
A large number of studies from various parts of the world show that educational
returns for an additional year of schooling are positive and range anywhere from 5
percent in developed countries to as high as 29 percent in developing countries (see
Psacharopoulos, 1985, 1994). In the 1994 survey, Psacharopoulos, finds that returns
to education in Africa are higher than for other regions. This finding has generated
debate about whether the reported estimated rates of return prevail for some African
countries given the existing labour market conditions. For instance, Bennell (1996)
suggests that the findings by Psacharopoulos (1994) for Africa are heavily influenced
by a few dated studies some of which were based on poor data. Besides, estimates of
returns to schooling in Africa since the 1980s have been moderate (Appleton, 1999).
Given the inconclusiveness of these studies, policy makers are unclear as to where to
invest the limited resources at their disposal. Consequently more accurate estimates
of returns to education are useful for purposes of informing policy makers. There is
3need, therefore, for refined estimates of returns to education based on elaborate and
more recent data. This is important because rates of return to education in Kenya
have been shown to vary over time (see Appleton et al 1999 and Manda 1997) and
therefore estimates based on old data may be of little value in terms of informing
policy today.
When estimating private returns to education, it is normally assumed that returns to
an individual are independent of the human capital endowments of others. This
assumption, which dominates most of the previous studies, ignores a major aspect of
human capital theory - namely human capital externalities. Human capital externality
suggests that increasing the human capital of one person will have some impact not
only on the earnings and returns to education for that individual but also on earnings
and returns to education for other individuals.
In a competitive economy, where workers are paid the value of their marginal
product, increasing the average human capital induces an increase in the demand for
skilled labour (the demand effect). Similarly, a direct consequence of a large share of
the population, which is educated is to increase the supply of skilled labor. The net
effect on earnings is positive when human capital externalities are such that the
demand effect dominates the supply effect (see Michud and Vencatachellum, 2003).
Failure to control for human capital externalities in the earnings equation can
therefore lead to biased estimates of the   parameters of the earnings function.
An interesting extension of the idea of human capital externalities concerns the
impact of male (female) education on the earnings for women (men). If in fact it is
the case that there are significant positive female human capital externalities on, for
example, male earnings, then the limited emphasis on women’s education in Africa
could actually have the effect of lowering the earnings of men, ceteris paribus. On
the other hand, providing education opportunities to both men and women has
salutary effects on overall earnings.
A number of studies have previously analyzed returns to education in Kenya (e.g.,
Bigsten 1984, Knight and Sabot 1990, Knight, Sabot and Hovey 1992, Manda 1997,
Appleton, Bigsten and Manda 1999).  To some extent this paper builds on these
4studies and estimates private returns to education using a comprehensive micro
dataset of full-time workers collected by the Government in 1994. In addition to
estimating the private returns to education, the paper focuses on effects of human
capital externalities on earnings.
2. Data and Methods
We use data from the Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) of 1994 undertaken by the
Central Bureau of Statistics (Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of
Kenya). The survey aimed at collecting data, which would assist the government to
assess the status of the welfare of the population. The survey covered all the eight
provinces in Kenya and gathered information from each district on employment
status, health, fertility, household size, crops and livestock, household incomes and
expenditure on various items, children’s nutrition, and social amenities. The data set
also has information on individual characteristics such as education level, age and
marital status. We supplement this information in the survey with district level
measure of education for males and females (measure of human capital externality).
The WMS of 1994 provides information on individual earnings, education and age,
which is useful in the estimation of returns to education. The sample used in our
study includes only individuals in the working age group 15 to 65 years and who are
full-time employees. The sample size used consists of 6,140 observations covering
individuals both in the rural (4,878) and urban areas (1,262).
A worker’s specific human capital is approximated by the highest education level
attained and by years of potential experience.  We define a worker’s potential
experience as his age minus six years and number of years of schooling.2 We capture
the effect of education on earnings using dummy variables to represent levels of
schooling. Average years of education in a district (for males and females) are used
as a measure of human capital externality. Using this variable as a measure of human
capital externality could be criticised on the grounds that it may be a proxy for other
things such as quality of education or different labour market conditions in various
districts other than human capital externality.  We use pupil-trained teacher ratio for
primary schools as a proxy for quality of education. A high pupil-trained teacher
5ratio indicates low quality of education and vice versa. Since people do not
necessarily work in districts where they went to school, the variable may not capture
differences in public education investments or variations in regional quality of
education.  However, it is possible that if a quality of education exists in a particular
district (especially in primary schools), it could attract people to work in such a
district so that their children could benefit from the quality education.
In general, differences in the quality of labour market conditions are likely to exist
between rural and urban areas or between public and private sector. We control for
these differences by including regional dummies in the earnings equation. Also, since
we use data on full-time employees only, this is likely to reduce the heterogeneity
problem because there isn’t much difference among these employees in rural and
urban areas and between public and private sector.3 Other control variables include
regional (provincial) dummies.  The variables used in the analysis are defined in
Appendix Table 1 and the descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix Table 2.
2.1 The Model
We follow Mincer (1974) in estimating a semi-logarithmic equation for the
determinants of earnings
ln(Wi) = α + ΣβkSki + λ Ai + δZi + Ui (1)
where
Wi is monthly earnings for worker i; Sk are dummy variables representing the highest
level of schooling attained; A is potential experience; Z is a vector of control
variables such as (sex and region) and U is an error term. It would have been useful
to use hourly earnings, but information on hours of work was not available in the
data set. To minimise the error in monthly earnings due to variations in hours worked
by full-time and non full-time employees, we make use of data on full-time
employees only.
6Our main interest in estimating equation (1) is to calculate the private rate of return
to education. Estimates of private returns to education conventionally measure the
benefits of education in the form of higher wages. From equation (1), the rate of
return to a given level of education is derived as shown in equation (2).
Rate of return to a year of education = [exp(βh- βl)-1]/(Eh - El) (2)
Where βh is the estimated coefficient of a higher level of education dummy (e.g., a
dummy for completed secondary education); βl is the estimated coefficient of a lower
level of schooling dummy (e.g. a dummy for completed primary education); Eh is the
total number of years taken  to attain a particular level of higher education;  and El is
the  total number of years spent schooling at a lower  level of the education system.
For instance, to calculate the return to secondary education, Eh will be 12 years (i.e.,
eight  years of primary schooling plus four years of secondary education); and El will
be 8 years (i.e.,  eight  years of primary education) so that (Eh - El) = 4 years. More
generally, equation (2) computes the rate of return for a year of schooling at any level
of the education system. For example, if everyone has primary education, and the
highest education attainment at that level is 5 years, the lower level of education is
necessarily 4 years so that  (Eh - El) = 1. If  (Eh - El) = 0, it means that the highest level
of educational attainment, Eh, is zero. In other words, there is no investment in
schooling and therefore the rate of return to education is undefined, as is evidently
clear from expression (2).
2.2 Estimation Issues
Estimates of returns to education may suffer from several drawbacks. These include
omission of relevant variables and endogeneity of schooling. Although several
approaches to these problems have been developed,  this study does not  fully benefit
from  them due to data limitations.
Omitted Variables
Omission of unobserved characteristics such as ability can bias conventional OLS
estimates (see Blackburn and Neumark, 1995). Including ability proxies tends to
7lower the estimated returns to schooling indicating that OLS estimates are biased
upwards. Other studies (e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Ashenfelter and
Zimmerman, 1993; Taubman, 1976) have used panel data for twins to estimate
returns to schooling. The idea behind this approach is that differencing eliminates the
effects of common ability and family-background so that the estimates are purged of
these time-invariant effects.  Studies using this approach display varying results, with
some reporting slightly lower and others reporting slightly higher educational return
estimates as compared to conventional OLS estimates. Using data on workers in
Kenyan and Tanzanian urban enterprises, Knight and Sabot (1990) test whether
human capital (measured as cognitive skill) has an independent effect on earnings or
if it simply signals inborn ability (measured by ability test scores). They find that,
though ability might have a role in wage formation, controlling for it does not
diminish the effect of human capital on earnings.
OLS estimates of the effect of education on earnings are consistent only if, for
example, unobserved variables are not correlated with both education and earnings.
However, if an unobserved characteristic, say ‘ability’ has a positive effect on
earnings and schooling, then OLS estimates of the returns to schooling will be biased
upwards. Another source of bias is measurement error in schooling. This may
generate a negative correlation between the earnings and schooling equation error
terms and induce a negative bias in OLS estimates (see Griliches, 1977 and
Blackburn and Neumark, 1995).
A negative bias could also arise if workers with low schooling have a higher earnings
capacity (and higher returns to schooling), but curtailed their education due to higher
discount rates.  This negative correlation is implied in the Becker model of human
capital investment in which schooling is acquired until the marginal return to
schooling equates the discount rate (see Card, 1995).
Other studies find that family background such as parent’s education and income
(another commonly omitted set of characteristics) has a positive impact on wages and
that returns to education decline when family background variables are included in
8the earnings regressions (e.g., Wambugu 2003). Armitage and Sabot (1987)
examined how parental education interacted with employees’ earnings in
establishments located in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. They find
that the private return to secondary education increased monotonically with parental
education. Wambugu (2003) using data on Kenyan manufacturing firm employees,
finds that controlling for parental education in the earnings function reduces the level
of returns to workers education only by a small percentage.
The data set used in this study does not provide information that can be used to
control for ability, family background, or personal discount rates. Also, as is the case
in most developing countries, panel data of workers in Kenya is not available.
However, we make the assumption that though unobserved ability might have a role
in wage formation, it does not significantly diminish the effect of human capital on
earnings (e.g., see Knight and Sabot, 1990). In this study it is not possible to control
for unobserved ability or eliminate its effect using panel data. This may bias our OLS
estimates upwards.  However, we use pupil-trained teacher ratio for primary schools
as a proxy for quality of education at the district level, and thus at least mitigate the
bias due to omission of this variable from the estimating equation.
Endogeneity of education
If a person takes into account how educational attainment will affect his earnings,
then the person’s educational level is endogenous to the determination of those
earnings. The schooling endogeneity problem can be taken into account by
constructing a ‘selectivity-correction’ term from a schooling attainment equation and
then including the correction term in the earnings equation.  Studies using this
method typically report higher returns as compared to OLS estimates (e.g., Gaston
and Tenjo, 1992; Hansen, 1997). An alternative way of solving schooling
endogeneity relies on using exogenous (or ‘natural’) variation in educational
attainment (such as differences in educational attainment across siblings) to provide
instrumental variable (IV) estimates of returns to education. In this case, one has to
look for variables that are strongly correlated with education but that do not directly
9influence earnings (see Card, 1993; Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Harmon and Walker,
1995; Bedi and Gaston, 1999).4 The main finding in these studies is that returns to
education that take into account the potential endogenous nature of education often
exceed standard estimates and the difference is large in some studies.
Unfortunately, information on variables that can be used in the analysis of schooling
attainment function such as family background is not available, and we do not have
any information on twins or siblings. We do not therefore attempt to control for
endogeneity of schooling. This means that our estimates for returns to education
based on OLS will be biased downward compared to results from studies that control
for schooling endogeneity. However, results based on instrumental variable
estimation may also be sensitive to the quality of variables used as instruments
(Wambugu, 2003).  We do not expect the level of education attainment in Kenya to
be determined by level of earnings because most students drop out of school as a
result of poor performance in national examinations.
3. Results
The estimated results are presented in full in appendix Tables 3A to 3F. The
estimations are done for national, urban and rural areas and, for males and females.
The results are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Equation (1).
Education, potential experience, sex and location dummy variables explain about 30
percent of the log monthly earnings for all workers, 22 percent for males, and 34
percent for females at the national level. In the rural and urban areas, the variables
explain between 26 and 42 percent of the variations in earnings as shown in appendix
Tables 3A to 3F. The coefficients for most of the independent variables are
statistically significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient of pupil–trained
teacher ratio is negative as expected, and statistically significant in most of the
equations. This shows that this variable is inversely related to earnings. Earnings are
high in districts where quality of education is high (i.e., where the pupil-trained
teacher ratio is low). Therefore the quality of education at the primary level in a
given district has some positive impact on earnings in the region.
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3.1 Effects of Human Capital Externality on Earnings
Our first contribution in this paper is the use of district-level education attainment of
workers to capture the direct effect of human capital externality on earnings. Since
the male and female average human capital variables are highly correlated, we
investigated their effects by including them in separate equations. At the national
level, the female human capital externality has a positive statistically significant
effect on earnings while the male human capital externality has a positive but
insignificant effect on earnings. The estimates show that an increase in average
human capital for females has a positive impact on earnings of all workers. At the
national level men benefit more from the increase of female human capital than from
the accumulation of their own  human capital. In the rural areas male human capital
externality has a negative and significant effect on earnings while female human
capital externality has a positive but insignificant effect.
The effect of district level average education for males and females on earnings is
positive and statistically significant for all workers in the urban areas. This suggests
that in the urban areas, the supply effect of skill accumulation on wages does not
dominate the demand effect. For instance, an increase in the supply of skilled men
and women is accompanied by an increase in the demand for their respective labour
services in such a way that the positive demand effect on wages exceeds the negative
supply effect, leading to a net increase in earnings. Consequently, increasing the
proportion of workers who are educated has two effects on returns to education.
First, as explained in Mwabu and Schultz (2000), the marginal return to education
falls as more people are educated so that the new earnings function is flatter.
Second, the returns to earnings function shifts upwards such that for a given level of
education, a worker earns more. We consider in greater detail the effect of human
capital externalities on returns to education in the next subsection. Our results find
support in Griliches’ (1977) work as well as in the endogenous growth literature
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Next, we consider the cross effects of male human capital on female earnings and
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vice-versa. At the national level, when the model is estimated on the sample of male
workers, an increase in the average education of female labor force has a significant
positive effect on male earnings.  Also, when the model is estimated on a sample of
females, an increase in the education of males has a positive but insignificant effect
on female earnings. In the rural areas, the cross effect of human capital externality on
earnings is insignificant.
In the urban areas, when the model is estimated on the sample of male workers, an
increase in the average education of female labor force has a significant positive
effect on male earnings.  Also, when the model is estimated on a sample of females,
an increase in the education of males has a significant positive effect on female
earnings. One explanation for this result is that, ceteris paribus, if male (female)
workers education increases, the demand for female (male) workers increases. The
increase in the demand for male workers may be due to the fact that when female
human capital increases, it increases male productivity. Also, if female earnings
increase, it must be due to the demand effect originating from male human capital
externalities, which increases female productivity. Thus, it appears that education
levels of males and females reinforce each other in the urban labor market thereby
raising productivity and wages of both sexes. Thus policies or social norms that
restrict education opportunities of one group have three deleterious effects. First,
such policies or norms lower earnings of the disadvantaged group. Second, since the
positive externalities that would have arisen from human capital accumulation of the
disadvantaged group are stifled, the full labor market productivity of the favored
group is never attained. Finally, discriminatory policies have the undesirable effect of
lowering average earnings and hence, the welfare of the two groups. In general,
equitable public and private investment in both male and female education is justified
on Pareto efficiency grounds.
3.2 Returns to Education
Table 1 shows returns to education at the national level and by region and gender
before taking into account the effect of human capital externality. The private returns
to education generally increase with the level of education. At the national level, the
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rate of return to primary education is 7.7 percent, 23.4 percent for secondary
education and 25.1 percent for university education.5 Returns to education in the
urban areas are higher than returns to education in the rural areas. Thus, it is more
beneficial for those with formal education to work in the urban areas than in rural
areas. In the rural areas, returns to university education are lower than returns to
secondary education, an indication that university graduates are worse-off working in
the rural than in the urban areas. Those individuals with secondary education do not
lose as much as those with university education when employed in the rural areas. In
general returns to college education are lower than returns to secondary and
university education in the urban areas, but higher than return to secondary and
university education in the rural areas.
Returns to education in the urban areas compare very well with those of previous
studies (e.g., Appleton, Bigsten and Manda1999; Manda 1997).6 It is important to
note however, that our estimates of returns to education for urban areas are greater
that those estimated by Wambugu (2003) for the same period. We can nevertheless
among other things attribute this difference to differences in the data sets used in the
two studies, as Wambugu’s study uses data on employees in manufacturing firms
only.
Although our estimates of private returns to education may deviate  slightly  from the
true rates of return (due to estimation biases  considered  in section (2.2)), they serve
as a baseline for  comparing  the rates of return in a specification that includes a
proxy for educational externalities, which is the focus of this paper.
Table 1: Private Returns to Education (%)
Completed
Primary
Completed
Secondary
College University
National  7.7 23.4 23.6 25.1
Urban  9.3 34.4 26.2 34.8
Rural  7.8 21.0 22.4 14.2
All males  4.4 21.2 12.8 23.3
Urban males  6.1 25.6 17.9 30.7
Rural males  4.2 20.2 12.4 12.6
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All females 13.2 36.3 43.5 62.5
Urban females  6.2 44.9 28.0 66.0
Rural females 16.0 30.3 51.5 18.6
The returns to education for females are relatively higher than the returns to
education for males both at the national and regional level. At the primary education
level, the returns to primary education for females are about triple the returns for
males at the national and for rural areas. In the urban areas, returns to primary
education for men and women are similar. At the national level, returns to college
and university education are much higher for women than for men. For instance,
returns to women's college and university education are about triple that for men at
the national level. Returns to college and university education are higher for women
than for men in both rural and urban areas.
Generally, it is more beneficial for men with primary, secondary, college and
university education to work in the urban areas than in the rural areas. On the other
hand it is more beneficial for women with primary and college education to work in
the rural areas while those with secondary and university education to work in the
urban areas.
Tables 2 and 3 show returns to education after taking into account male and female
human capital externalities respectively. First, taking into account the human capital
externality generally reduces the estimated coefficients for the education dummies.
However, the decline in the coefficients is not uniform across the education levels
(see Tables 3A to 3F in the Appendix). The decline in the estimated coefficients at
certain levels of education is much greater than for others. As a result, there are
changes in the returns to education for certain levels of education.
As shown in the Tables 2 and 3, returns to education still increase with the level of
education. The rate of return to university education increases while the rate of return
to primary and college education declines when human capital externality is taken
into account in the earnings equation. However, there is negligible change in the
returns to education in the rural areas, and on secondary education when human
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capital externality is taken into account. In most cases, the returns to primary
education in the rural areas either increase by negligible amounts or remain about the
same.
Table 2: Returns to Education Taking into Account Male Human Capital Externality (%)
Completed
Primary
Completed
Secondary
College University
National  8.0 23.3 23.8 24.9
Urban  9.0 38.3 23.7 38.7
Rural  8.6 20.9 22.8 14.1
All males  4.6 21.1 13.2 23.0
Urban males  3.9 26.5 16.8 35.0
Rural males  4.7 20.3 12.9 16.7
All females  11.9 37.4 41.5 61.5
Urban females  0.7 61.9 18.4 60.6
Rural females  17.8 29.0 51.6 20.9
Table 3: Returns to Education Taking into Account Female Human Capital Externality (%)
Completed
Primary
Completed
Secondary
College University
National  7.2 23.5 23.2 25.7
Urban  5.9 35.0 23.7 37.7
Rural  7.6 21.1 22.2 14.4
All males  3.8 21.3 12.4 24.0
Urban males  3.5 26.8 15.8 36.0
Rural males  4.0 20.3 12.1 18.8
All females  13.4 36.3 42.5 62.5
Urban females  1.4 56.7 22.5 67.8
Rural females  18.3 30.2 50.4 21.7
These results have several implications. First, previous studies on private returns to
education especially in the urban areas by not taking into account human capital
externalities overestimate private returns to primary and college education, and
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underestimate private returns to university education, especially in the urban areas.
Human capital externality can be interpreted as capturing the net benefit to an
individual derived from the schooling of other individuals. Controlling for human
capital externality therefore isolates this net benefit from the usual measure of the
rate of return to education to give a pure private return to education. In other words,
holding constant the average schooling of other workers (Tables 2 and 3), the rate of
return to a year of primary education is lower than the rate obtained when there is no
control for the effect of average schooling in the earnings function for urban areas
(Table 1). Similarly, controlling for the effect of the average years of schooling in an
earnings equation raises the private rate of return to a year of university education
above that estimated without this control (Table 1). Starting with the latter case, we
explain these findings as follows.
An increase in the average level of schooling of all workers, which is excluded from
the earnings function reduces the scarcity premium associated with university
education (Table 1). Consequently, when human capital externality is taken into
account, we eliminate its effect on the scarcity premium, and as a result, the private
rate of return to university education increases (Tables 2 and 3). In contrast, private
returns to primary education decline when a variable that controls for the effect of
human capital externality is included in the earnings regression (see Tables 2 and 3)
because the beneficial effect of education of others is removed. In this case, average
schooling is a complement to productivity of those with primary level education in
the labour market so that when this complementarity is removed, the rate of return
falls.
4. Conclusion
This study analyses returns to education and the associated effects of the externality
of an individual's education (human capital externality) on earnings. Several OLS
regressions for the entire sample, and by gender and region are estimated. The results
show that human capital externality has a positive effect on earnings in the urban
areas. Human capital externality can be interpreted as representing the net benefit to
an individual arising from education of others. At the national level, the human
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capital externality for women's education has a significant impact on earnings
compared to that associated with men's schooling.
The private returns to education generally increase with the level of education. In the
rural areas, returns to university education are lower than returns to secondary and
college education. However, it is important to note that there are very few university
graduates working in the rural areas (see Appendix Table 2). Controlling for human
capital externality reduces returns to primary education but increases returns to
university education in the urban areas. However, human capital externality has
negligible effects on private returns to secondary education. The decline in returns to
primary education in urban areas when human capital externality is taken into
account reflects the decline in productivity of individuals with primary level of
education when beneficial effects of education of other individuals are removed.
Similarly, the increase in private returns to university education reflects the scarcity
premium of workers with that level of education.
In general, the results of our analysis show that public policies that expand schooling
opportunities for underprivileged social groups benefit the whole society via the
externality effects of education. The benefits are in terms of improved productivity
and  earnings. Also, the fact that private returns to education increase with the level
of education supports the current emphasis of government on free primary education.
Since, the returns to college and university education are higher than for lower levels,
they indicate that individuals would be willing to invest in higher education.
However, since the returns come only after completing education at these levels of
education, and given the fact that most Kenyans do not have resources to finance
higher education, loans should be provided to those individuals who choose to pursue
college and university education. Such loans should be extended especially to women
since they are grossly under-represented in institutions of higher learning. However,
considering the fact that Kenya’s capital markets are under-developed, government
role in extending or guaranteeing the loans is necessary.
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Notes
1 With the introduction of free primary education in 1974, enrolment in
primary school increased by 40 percent. However, the introduction of cost
sharing in education in the mid-1980s meant that parents were to spend more
on textbooks, stationery, development fund, activity fees, examination fees
and vacation tuitions fees, which partly led to a decline in primary school
enrolment. The first decline in enrolment between 1984-85 may be attributed
to the additional educational costs induced by the new educational structure
and curriculum. Similarly, the second enrolment decline between 1989-90
also appears to be cost-driven and may be attributed to the re-introduction of
school levies. This shows that in reality, primary education was not free.
However, following the election pledges and the election of a new
government in December 2002 general elections, primary education was
made free and this has resulted in a big enrolment increase of about 1,500,000
additional students.
2 Potential experience is estimated here by taking age minus six years minus
the number of years of education. This is based on the assumption that all
individuals start schooling at age six. However, it is possible that some start
school at an age earlier than six years. Also, we assume that individuals get
employed immediately after completing school, which is a strong assumption,
especially for women and youth who are underrepresented in the labor
market.
3 Full-time workers include persons who work for all the hours of work and for
all the working days as defined by the employer, except when on leave or
otherwise officially away. This excludes self employed, part-time workers
and casual workers. Part-time workers are employees who voluntarily work
fewer hours than normal for an establishment. Casual workers are individuals
who are engaged for a period not longer than 90 days and have no formal
employment contract with the employer and their services can be terminated
without notice. Our decision to use data on full-time employees is based on
the fact that it helps eliminate the uncertainty associated with earnings for self
employed, casual employees and also measurement errors in the earnings for
this categories.
4 The other literature using instrumental variable approach to estimate returns
to education include e.g., Uusitalo (1999) and Levin and Plug (1999) who use
family background variables as instruments for education, Angrist and
Krueger (1991) when estimating returns to education in the U.S use quarter of
birth as an instrument.  Harmon and Walker (1995) use change in minimum
school leaving-age in the U.K and Card (1993) uses geographic proximity to
college (the motivation being that if one is close to a college, the costs of
attendance would be relatively lower and would acquire more education).
5 Using imputed data on years of education derived from the information on
levels of education provided in the datasets we estimated the following
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specification of the earnings equation:  ln(Wi) = α + βYi  + βYi2 + λ Ai + δZi
+ Ui, where Y is the imputed years of education and W, A and Z are as earlier
defined in the text. The results of the estimations are shown on Tables 4A, 4B
and 4C. Comparison of returns to education at the national level, shows the
private returns to education for secondary, college and university based on
this specification are similar to those estimated based on equation (1) using
education dummies. However, private returns to primary education using
imputed years of education are higher than those based on primary education
dummies.  This is an indication that using primary education dummies may
underestimate private returns to primary schooling. Using dummy variables
for urban data only underestimates returns to primary education and
overestimates returns to secondary and university education.
6 Note that comparison across studies even with data from the same country is
not straightforward because of differences in data, time periods, specification
of earnings functions and measurement errors. In this study we compare our
private returns to education (see Table 1) with those of other studies based on
data for the mid-1990s.
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APPENDIX TABLES
      Appendix Table 1: Definition of variables
Variable
Definition
 Monthly earnings Natural logarithm of monthly earnings
No education 1 if an individual has no formal education, 0 otherwise
Incomplete primary education 1 if an individual joined but did not complete primary education, 0 otherwise
Completed primary education 1 if an individual completed primary education, 0 otherwise
Incomplete secondary education 1 if an individual joined but didn’t complete secondary education, 0 otherwise
Completed secondary education 1 if an individual completed four years of secondary education, 0 otherwise
University education 1 if an individual has university education, 0 otherwise
Potential experience Number of years an individual has been working
Potential experience squared The square of the number of years an individual has been working
Urban 1 if an individual lives in the urban area, 0 otherwise
Rural 1 if an individual lives in the rural area, 0 otherwise
Nairobi 1 if an individual lives in Nairobi Province, 0 otherwise
Coast 1 if an individual lives in Coast Province, 0 otherwise
Rift Valley 1 if an individual lives in Rift Valley Province, 0 otherwise
Western 1 if an individual lives in Western Province, 0 otherwise
Eastern 1 if an individual lives in Eastern Province, 0 otherwise
North Eastern 1 if an individual lives in North Eastern Province, 0 otherwise
Nyanza 1 if an individual lives in Nyanza Province, 0 otherwise
Central 1 if an individual lives in Central Province, 0 otherwise
Male 1 if an individual is male, 0 otherwise
Female 1 if an individual is female, 0 otherwise
Pupil/trained teacher ratio Is the number of students per trained teacher in primary school
District average education for
males (years)
District average years of education for men
District average education for
females (years)
District average years of education for women
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      Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics-Mean
Variable National Urban Rural Males Females
Mean monthly earnings 3192.2
(5829.1)
4163.1
(7875.1)
2939.98
(5137.7)
3593.30
(6427.3)
1960.56
(3076.5)
No education 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.23
Incomplete primary education 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.29 0.26
Complete primary education  0.17 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.14
Incomplete secondary education 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15
Complete secondary education 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.19 0.15
College education 0.04 0.0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06
University education 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01
Potential experience 19.32
(9.96)
17.35
(9.18)
19.83
(10.1)
20.80
(9.75)
14.77
(9.19)
Potential experience squared 472.52
(416.7)
385.19
(368.0)
495.21
(425.6)
527.85
(425.4)
302.65
(336.2)
Urban 0.21 - - 0.17 0.31
Rural 0.79 - - 0.83 0.69
Nairobi 0.03 0.13 - 0.02 0.04
Coast 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.10
Rift Valley 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.26
Western 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07
Eastern 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.20
North Eastern 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Nyanza 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.13
Central 0.19 0.07 0.23 0.20 0.18
District average education for males
(years)
7.32
(1.33)
8.13
(1.44)
7.74
(1.28)
7.82
(1.32)
7.81
(1.37)
District average education for
females (years)
7.82
(1.82)
7.56
(1.81)
7.26
(1.82)
7.32
(1.82)
7.33
(1.82)
Pupil trained teacher ration 36.8
(8.55)
37.02
(8.26)
36.81
(8.62)
36.91
(8.58)
36.67
(8.44)
Proportion of Males 0.75 0.63 0.79 - -
Proportion of Females 0.25 0.73 0.21 - -
Sample Size 6140 1262 4878 4655 1485
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Appendix Table 3A: Estimated Earnings Coefficients for (All Workers and Male Sub-
sample)
All Workers Male WorkersVariables
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 6.118**
(0.121)
6.309**
(0.187)
5.869**
(0.155)
6.587**
(0.138)
6.984**
(0.208)
6.352**
(0.176)
Potential experience 0.093**
(0.005)
0.093**
(0.005)
0.094**
(0.005)
0.106**
(0.005)
0.106**
(0.005)
0.106**
(0.005)
Potential experience
Squared
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
Incomplete Primary
Dummy
0.195**
(0.044)
0.204**
(0.044)
0.176**
(0.044)
0.078
(0.050)
0.096
(0.051)
0.065
(0.051)
Completed Primary
Dummy
0.481**
(0.050)
0.496**
(0.051)
0.455**
(0.051)
0.286**
(0.056)
0.314**
(0.057)
0.268**
(0.057)
Incomplete
secondary dummy
0.750**
(0.052)
0.765**
(0.053)
0.728**
(0.053)
0.517**
(0.059)
0.547**
(0.060)
0.502**
(0.059)
Completed
secondary
1.142**
(0.051)
1.154**
(0.052)
1.118**
(0.052)
0.899**
(0.058)
0.927**
(0.059)
0.883**
(0.058)
College dummy 1.767**
(0.077)
1.693**
(0.078)
1.646**
(0.078)
1.225**
(0.091)
1.261**
(0.092)
1.200**
(0.092)
 University dummy 1.702**
(0.113)
1.713**
(0.113)
1.688**
(0.113)
1.431**
(0.116)
1.451**
(0.116)
1.426**
(0.116)
Pupil trained teacher
ratio
-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.007**
(0.001)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.002)
Male Dummy 0.586**
(0.033)
0.585**
(0.033)
0.589**
(0.033)
Urban Dummy 0.181**
(0.036)
0.187**
(0.036)
0.172**
(0.036)
 0.236**
 (0.042)
0.247**
(0.016)
0.225**
(0.042)
District Average
Education for Males
0.019
(0.014)
0.040
(0.016)
District Average
Education for
Females
0.026**
(0.010)
0.024**
(0.011)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.22 0.22
No. of Observations 6140 6140 6140 4655 4655 4655
**significant at 1%level; *  significant at 5% level; Standard Errors in Parentheses
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Appendix Table 3B: Estimated Earnings Coefficients for Females Workers and Urban
Workers
Female Workers Urban Workers
Variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 6.304**
(0.246)
5.733**
(0.407)
6.329**
(0.094)
 5.887**
(0.203)
4.417**
(0.371)
4.968**
(0.288)
Potential experience 0.088**
(0.010)
0.089**
(0.010)
0.088**
(0.010)
0.087**
(0.011)
0.085**
(0.024)
0.085**
(0.010)
Potential experience
Squared
-0.002**
(0.0003)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0003)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
Incomplete Primary
Dummy
0.199**
(0.094)
0.161*
(0.092)
0.199**
(0.094)
0.285**
(0.116)
0.137
(0.119)
0.146
(0.119)
Completed Primary
Dummy
0.722**
(0.107)
0.667**
(0.112)
0.727**
(0.113)
0.555**
(0.126)
0.381**
(0.131)
0.387**
(0.131)
Incomplete
secondary dummy
1.146**
(0.106)
1.100**
(0.110)
1.150**
(0.111)
0.982**
(0.121)
0.819**
(0.125)
0.857**
(0.123)
Completed
secondary
1.620**
(0.108)
1.528**
(0.110)
1.624**
(0.115)
1.421**
(0.119)
1.260**
(0.123)
1.263*
(0.123)
College dummy 2.442**
(0.145)
2.390**
(0.147)
2.447**
(0.149)
2.001**
(0.159)
1.797**
(0.164)
1.800
(0.164)
University dummy 2.676**
(0.374)
2.628**
(0.375)
2.680**
(0.376)
2.120**
(0.184)
2.003**
(0.185)
2.021**
(0.184)
Pupil trained teacher
ratio
 -0.007
 (0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
Male Dummy 0.470
(0.066)
0.486
(0.066)
0.481
(0.066)
Urban Dummy 0.092**
(0.070)
0.072**
(0.071)
0.093
(0.070)
District Average
Education for Males
0.059**
(0.034)
0.158**
(0.034)
District Average
Education for
Females
-0.003
(0.069)
0.109**
(0.024)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.42
No. of Observations 1485 1485 1485 1262 1262 1262
**significant at 1%level; *  significant at 5% level; Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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Appendix Table 3C: Estimated Earnings Coefficients for Rural Workers and Urban Male
Workers
Rural Workers Urban Male Workers
Variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 5.973**
(0.103)
6.358**
(0.155)
5.885**
(0.128)
5.388**
(0.149)
5.388**
(0.378)
5.510**
(0.318)
Potential experience 0.093**
(0.005)
0.092**
(0.005)
0.093**
(0.005)
0.103**
(0.013)
0.102**
(0.013)
0.099**
(0.013)
Potential experience
Squared
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
-0.001**
(0.0003)
Incomplete Primary
Dummy
0.202**
(0.048)
0.222**
(0.048)
0.194**
(0.048)
0.187
(0.148)
0.111
(0.154)
0.078
(0.151)
Completed Primary
Dummy
0.486**
(0.054)
0.522**
(0.055)
0.475**
(0.055)
0.399**
(0.156)
0.309
(0.163)
0.269**
(0.161)
Incomplete
secondary dummy
0.729**
(0.058)
0.766**
(0.059)
0.718**
(0.059)
0.685**
(0.154)
0.600**
(0.160)
0.591**
(0.156)
Completed
secondary
1.096**
(0.057)
1.129**
(0.058)
1.086**
(0.058)
1.104**
(0.148)
1.019**
(0.155)
0.986**
(0.152)
College dummy 1.609**
(0.089)
1.650**
(0.090)
1.597**
(0.090)
1.535**
(0.215)
1.437**
(0.216)
1.386**
(0.219)
University dummy 1.450**
(0.152)
1.483**
(0.152)
1.446**
(0.152)
1.757**
(0.199)
1.698**
(0.202)
1.686**
(0.199)
Pupil trained teacher
ratio
-0.008**
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.002)
-0.007**
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Male Dummy 0.595**
(0.038)
0.594**
(0.038)
0.5929**
(0.019)
District Average
Education for Males
-0.054**
(0.016)
0.072**
(0.038)
District Average
Education for
Females
0.013
(0.011)
0.086**
(0.027)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28
No. of Observations 4878 4878 4878 801 801 801
**significant at 1%level; *  significant at 5% level; Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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Appendix Table 3D: Estimated Earnings Coefficients for Urban Female Workers and Rural
Male Workers
Urban female Workers Rural Male Workers
Variables
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 6.330**
(0.374)
3.078**
(0.099)
4.781**
(0.513)
6.318**
(0.184)
6.646**
(0.218)
6.181**
(0.204)
Potential experience 0.084**
(0.018)
0.080**
(0.018)
0.086**
(0.018)
0.105**
(0.006)
0.105**
(0.006)
0.106**
(0.006)
Potential experience Squared -0.001**
(0.0006)
-0.001**
(0.0005)
-0.001**
(0.0005)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
-0.002**
(0.0001)
Incomplete Primary Dummy -0.009
(0.195)
-0.332
(0.196)
-0.277
(0.201)
0.088
(0.053)
0.107*
(0.054)
0.080
(0.054)
Completed Primary Dummy 0.408**
(0.219)
0.051**
(0.220)
0.106**
(0.227)
0.288**
(0.061)
0.319**
(0.062)
0.277**
(0.061)
Incomplete secondary
dummy
1.048**
(0.203)
0.716**
(0.203)
0.806**
(0.207)
0.522**
(0.065)
0.557**
(0.066)
0.510**
(0.066)
Completed secondary 1.586**
(0.211)
1.297**
(0.209)
1.290*
(0.218)
0.882**
(0.064)
0.913**
(0.064)
0.872**
(0.064)
College dummy 2.195**
(0.246)
1.736**
(0.249)
1.806
(0.258)
1.200**
(0.101)
1.240**
(0.102)
1.182
(0.151)
University dummy 2.677**
(0.443)
2.333**
(0.430)
2.400**
(0.439)
1.290**
(0.151)
1.319**
(0.151)
1.290**
(0.006)
Pupil trained teacher ratio -0.002
(0.008)
0.0002
(0.008)
-0.0005
(0.008)
-0.007**
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.002)
-0.006**
(0.002)
District Average Education
for Males
0.362**
(0.061)
-0.049**
(0.017)
District Average Education
for Females
0.205**
(0.048)
0.019
(0.012)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.20 0.20 0.20
No. of Observations 461 461 461 3854 3854 3854
**significant at 1%level; *  significant at 5% level; Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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Appendix Table 3E: Estimated Earnings Coefficients for Rural Male Workers
Rural Female Workers
Variables
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 4.889**
(0.281)
5.562**
(0.486)
6.068**
(0.411)
Potential experience 0.088**
(0.012)
0.088**
(0.012)
0.087**
(0.012)
Potential experience Squared -0.002**
(0.0003)
-0.002**
(0.0003)
-0.002**
(0.0003)
Incomplete Primary Dummy 0.232**
(0.103)
0.260**
(0.105)
0.279**
(0.106)
Completed Primary Dummy 0.825**
(0.125)
0.885**
(0.030)
0.901**
(0.031)
Incomplete secondary dummy 1.117**
(0.132)
1.159**
(0.130)
1.182**
(0.135)
Completed secondary 1.619**
(0.132)
1.654**
(0.133)
1.694**
(0.137)
College dummy 2.554**
(0.193)
2.590
(0.194)
2.614
(0.195)
University dummy 2.062**
(0.798)
2.143**
(0.799)
2.195**
(0.799)
Pupil trained teacher ratio -0.007
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.004)
District Average Education for
Males
-0.071
(0.042)
District Average Education for
Females
-0.054
(0.028)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.29 0.29 0.29
No. of Observations 1024 1024 1024
**significant at 1%level; *  significant at 5% level; Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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Appendix Table 4A: Private Returns to Education (%) using imputed years of education
Sub-sample Completed Primary Completed
Secondary
College University
National  12.8 19.2 23.2 24.9
Urban  15.6 23.7 27.7 29.7
Rural  12.0 17.9 20.8 22.3
All males  10.4 13.0 21.0 22.8
Urban males  12.3 20.1 23.9 25.9
Rural males  10.0 16.4 19.7 21.3
All females  19.5 30.9 36.6 39.4
Urban females  19.6 33.5 40.4 43.9
Rural females  19.4 29.9 35.2 37.9
 Appendix Table 4B: Private Returns to Education (%) Using Imputed Years of Education and Taking
into Account Male Human Capital Externality
Sub-sample Completed Primary Completed
Secondary
College University
National  12.8 19.7 23.2 24.9
Urban  14.9 24.6 29.4 31.8
Rural  12.0 17.9 20.8 22.2
All males  10.4 17.3 20.7 22.3
Urban males  12.0 20.6 24.8 27.0
Rural males  10.1 16.3 19.4 21.0
All females  18.9 31.5 37.8 40.9
Urban females  18.0 34.7 43.1 47.2
Rural females  19.0 30.2 36.0 38.9
Appendix Table 4B: Private Returns to Education (%) Using Imputed Years of Education and Taking
into Account Female Human Capital Externality
Sub-sample Completed Primary Completed
Secondary
College University
National  12.8 19.8 23.1 24.8
Urban  15.3 24.2 28.7 30.9
Rural  12.0 17.9 20.8 22.32
All males  10.5 17.4 20.7 22.4
Urban males  12.2 20.3 24.3 26.3
Rural males  10.0 16.4 19.5 21.1
All females  19.2 31.3 37.4 40.4
Urban females  18.6 34.7 42.7 46.8
Rural females  17.9 30.2 35.7 38.5
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